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ABSTRACT
The study of canonically complete attribute-based access
control (ABAC) languages is relatively new. A canonically
complete language is useful as it is functionally complete
and provides a “normal form” for policies. However, previ-
ous work on canonically complete ABAC languages requires
that the set of authorization decisions is totally ordered,
which does not accurately reflect the intuition behind the
use of the allow, deny and not-applicable decisions in ac-
cess control. A number of recent ABAC languages use a
fourth value and the set of authorization decisions is par-
tially ordered. In this paper, we show how canonical com-
pleteness in multi-valued logics can be extended to the case
where the set of truth values forms a lattice. This enables
us to investigate the canonical completeness of logics having
a partially ordered set of truth values, such as Belnap logic,
and show that ABAC languages based on Belnap logic, such
as PBel, are not canonically complete. We then construct a
canonically complete four-valued logic using connections be-
tween the generators of the symmetric group (defined over
the set of decisions) and unary operators in a canonically
suitable logic. Finally, we propose a new authorization lan-
guage PTaCL64 , an extension of PTaCL, which incorporates
a lattice-ordered decision set and is canonically complete.
We then discuss how the advantages of PTaCL64 can be
leveraged within the framework of XACML.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Access control; Authoriza-
tion; Security requirements; •Software and its engineer-
ing → Specialized application languages;
Keywords
XACML, PTaCL, decision operators, combining algorithms,
functional completeness, canonical completeness
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1. INTRODUCTION
Access control is one of the most important security ser-
vices in multi-user computer systems, providing a mech-
anism for constraining the interaction between (authenti-
cated) users and protected resources. Generally, access
control is implemented by an authorization service, which
includes an authorization decision function for deciding
whether a user request to access a resource (an “access re-
quest”) should be permitted or not. In its simplest form
an authorization decision function either returns an allow or
deny decision.
Most implementations of access control use authorization
policies, where a user request to access a resource is eval-
uated with respect to a policy that defines which requests
are authorized. Many recent languages for the specification
of authorization policies are designed for “open”, distributed
systems (rather than the more traditional “closed”, central-
ized systems in which the set of users was assumed to be
known in advance). Such languages do not necessarily rely
on user identities to specify policies; instead, policies are de-
fined in terms of other user and resource attributes. The
most widely used attribute-based access control (ABAC)
language is XACML [14, 17]. However, XACML suffers from
poorly defined and counterintuitive semantics [10, 15], and is
inconsistent in its articulation of policy evaluation. PTaCL
is a more formal language for specifying authorization poli-
cies [6], providing a concise syntax for policy targets and
precise semantics for policy evaluation.
Crampton and Williams [7] recently introduced the no-
tion of canonical completeness for ABAC languages, show-
ing that XACML and PTaCL are not canonically complete
and developing a variant of PTaCL that is canonically com-
plete. These results apply to languages that support three
decision values, which are assumed to be totally ordered.
However, there are certain situations where it is useful to
have four decisions available, and some languages, such as
PBel [4], BelLog [18] and Rumpole [12], use four decisions,
which are partially ordered.
In this paper, we extend existing results to languages that
support four decision values, which need not be totally or-
dered. We show that PBel [4], perhaps the best-known
four-valued ABAC language, is not canonically complete.
We then develop a canonically complete ABAC language,
based on PTaCL syntax and semantics. The language is
abstract, but its operators could be implemented as com-
bining algorithms in XACML, thereby leveraging the fea-
tures that XACML provides for specifying attribute-based
requests and targets, the evaluation of targets with respect
to requests, and the storage and evaluation of policies.
In Section 2 we discuss background material and related
work, which provides us with the primary motivation for this
paper: to develop a canonically complete 4-valued logic to
support a tree-structured authorization language. The main
contributions of this work are:
• to extend Jobe’s work on canonical completeness in
multi-valued logics to the case where the set of truth
values forms a lattice (Section 3.2);
• to establish that existing 4-valued logics are not canon-
ically complete (Section 3.3);
• to construct a canonically complete 4-valued logic
(Section 4);
• to construct a 4-valued, canonically complete autho-
rization language for ABAC (Section 5).
We conclude the paper with a summary of our contribu-
tions and a discussion of future work.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we summarize background material
and related work, including tree-structured ABAC lan-
guages, canonical completeness, and four-valued languages
for ABAC, thereby providing motivation for the work in the
remainder of the paper.
2.1 Completeness in Multi-valued Logics
Let V be a set of truth values. The set of formulae Φ(L)
that can be written in a (multi-valued) propositional logic
L = (V,Ops) is defined by V and the set of operators Ops.
For brevity, we will write L when V and Ops are obvious
from context.
Let V be a totally ordered set of m truth values,
{0, . . . ,m− 1}, with 0 < 1 < · · · < m − 1. Then we say
L = (V,Ops) is canonically suitable if and only if there
exist two formulas φmax and φmin of arity 2 in Φ(L) such
that φmax(x, y) returns max {x, y} and φmin(x, y) returns
min {x, y}. We will usually write φmax and φmin using the
infix operators g and uprise respectively.
Example 1. Standard propositional logic with truth val-
ues 0 and 1, and operators ∨ and ¬, representing dis-
junction and negation, respectively, is canonically suitable:
φmax(x, y) is simply x ∨ y, while φmin(x, y) is ¬(¬x ∨ ¬y)
(that is, conjunction).
A function f : V n → V is completely specified by a truth
table containing n columns and mn rows. However, not
every truth table can be represented by a formula in a given
logic L = (V,Ops). L is said to be functionally complete if for
every function f : V n → V , there is a formula φ ∈ Φ(L) of
arity n whose evaluation corresponds to the truth table. In
Section 2.2, we explain why we may regard a tree-structured
authorization language as a logic defined by a set of decisions
and the set of policy-combining operators. In this sense,
XACML is not functionally complete [7], while PTaCL [6]
and PBel are [4].
A selection operator Sj(a1,...,an) is an n-ary operator de-
fined as follows:
Sj(a1,...,an)(x1, . . . , xn) =
{
j if (x1, . . . , xn) = (a1, . . . , an),
0 otherwise.
We will write a to denote the tuple (a1, . . . , an) ∈ V n when
no confusion can occur. Note that S0a is the same for all
a ∈ V n, and S0a(x) = 0 for all x ∈ V n. Illustrative examples
of binary selection operators (for a 4-valued logic) are shown
in Figure 1.
S1(0,2) 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
S2(1,1) 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 2 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
S3(3,0) 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 3 0 0 0
Figure 1: Selection operators S1(0,2), S
2
(1,1) and S
3
(3,0)
Selection operators play a central role in the development
of canonically complete logics because an arbitrary function
f : V n → V can be expressed in terms of selection operators.
Consider, for example, the function
f(x, y) =

1 if x = 0, y = 2,
2 if x = y = 1,
3 if x = 3, y = 0,
0 otherwise.
Then it is easy to confirm that
f(x, y) ≡ S1(0,2)(x, y) g S2(1,1)(x, y) g S3(3,0)(x, y).
Moreover, Sc(a,b)(x, y) ≡ Sca(x) uprise Scb (y) for any a, b, c, x, y ∈
V . Thus,
f(x, y) ≡ (S10(x)upriseS12(y))g(S21(x)upriseS21(y))g(S33(x)upriseS30(y))
In other words, we can express f as the “disjunction” (g) of
“conjunctions” (uprise) of unary selection operators.
More generally, given the truth table of function f : V n →
V , we can write down an equivalent function in terms of
selection operators. Specifically, let
A = {a ∈ V n : f(a) > 0} ;
then, for all x ∈ V n,
f(x) =
j
a∈A
Sf(x)a (x).
Jobe established a number of results connecting the func-
tional completeness of a logic with the unary selection oper-
ators, summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Jobe [9, Theorems 1, 2; Lemma 1]).
A logic L is functionally complete if and only if each unary
selection operator is equivalent to some formula in L.
The normal form of formula φ in a canonically suitable
logic is a formula φ′ that has the same truth table as φ and
has the following properties:
• the only binary operators it contains are g and uprise;
• no binary operator is included in the scope of a unary
operator;
• no instance of g occurs in the scope of the uprise operator.
In other words, given a canonically suitable logic L contain-
ing unary operators ]1, . . . , ]`, a formula in normal form has
the form
rj
i=1
sk
j=1
]i,jxi,j
where ]i,j is a unary operator defined by composing the
unary operators in ]1, . . . , ]`. In the usual 2-valued propo-
sitional logic with a single unary operator (negation) this
corresponds to disjunctive normal form.
A canonically suitable logic is canonically complete if ev-
ery unary selection operator can be expressed in normal
form. It is known that there are canonically suitable 3-
valued logics that are: (i) not functionally complete [9, 11];
(ii) functionally complete but not canonically complete [9,
Theorem 4]; and (iii) canonically complete (and hence func-
tionally complete) [9, Theorem 6].
Jobe defined a canonically complete 3-valued logic [9].
The operators and the construction of the unary selection
operators using these operators are given in Appendix A.
The expression for f above could be expressed in normal
form, providing we could find suitable unary operators for a
4-valued logic. In Section 4.3 we explain how to produce a
suitable set of unary operators for an m-valued logic.
2.2 Tree-structured Languages for ABAC
Let D be a set of authorization decisions. Typically, we
assumeD contains the values 0, 1 and⊥ representing“deny”,
“allow” and “not-applicable”, respectively. We call 0 and 1
conclusive decisions. Let ⊕ be an associative binary opera-
tor defined on D and − be a unary operator defined on D.
Then
• an atomic policy is a pair (t, d), where d is a decision
in D and t is a target predicate;
• an atomic policy is a policy ;
• if p and p′ are policies, then (t, p⊕ p′) and (t,−p) are
policies.
We will write p to denote the policy (true, p).
The first stage in policy evaluation for a request q is to
determine whether a policy is“applicable” to q or not. Every
(well-formed) request q, allows us to assign a truth value to
the target t. Specifically, t may evaluate to true, in which
case the associated policy is applicable; otherwise the policy
is not applicable.1 Then, writing νq(t) to denote the truth
value assigned to t by q and δq(p) to denote the decision
assigned to policy p for request q, we define:
δq(t, p) =
{
δq(p) if νq(t) = 1,
⊥ otherwise;
δq(d) = d;
δq(−p) = −δq(p);
δq(p⊕ p′) = δq(p)⊕ δq(p′).
It is easy to see that we may represent a policy as a tree.
Hence, we describe policy languages of this nature as tree-
structured. The first stage in policy evaluation corresponds
1The evaluation of requests is not relevant to the exposi-
tion of this paper. XACML provides a means of specifying
requests and targets and an evaluation architecture for de-
termining whether a target is applicable or not.
to labeling the nodes of tree applicable or not applicable.
We then compute a decision for non-leaf nodes in the tree by
combining the decisions assigned to their respective children.
Figure 2 shows the tree for the policy(
t6, (t4,−(t3, ((t1, 1)⊕1 (t2, 0))))⊕2 (t5, 0)
)
and the evaluation of that policy for a request q such that
νq(ti) = true for all i except i = 2.
(t2, 0)(t1, 1)
(t3,⊕1)
(t4,−) (t5, 0)
(t6,⊕2)
⊥1
1⊕1 ⊥
−(1⊕1 ⊥) 0
−(1⊕1 ⊥)⊕2 0
Figure 2: A policy tree and its evaluation
There are several tree-structured ABAC languages in the
literature, including the OASIS standard XACML, PBel and
PTaCL [17, 6, 4].2 These languages differ to some ex-
tent in the choices of D and the set of operators that are
used. XACML, for example, defines several rule- and policy-
combining algorithms (which may be regarded as binary op-
erators), but no unary operators.3 PBel and PTaCL prefer
to define a rather small set of operators: PTaCL defines
a single binary operator and two unary operators, whereas
PBel defines two binary operators and a single unary oper-
ator. XACML and PTaCL use a three-valued decision set
comprising 0, 1 and ⊥, to which PBel adds >, which repre-
sents “conflict”.
The main difference between existing languages, however,
is the extent to which they are complete in the senses defined
in Section 2.1 [7]. We summarize these differences in Table 1,
where CS, FC and CC denote canonically suitable, func-
tionally complete and canonically complete, respectively. In
Section 3.3, we prove that PBel is canonically suitable but
not canonically complete.
2.3 The Value of Canonical Completeness
One of the main difficulties with using a tree-structured
language is writing the desired policy using the operators
provided by the language. In particular, if it is not possi-
ble to express a policy using a single target and decision, the
policy author must engineer the desired policy by combining
sub-policies using the set of operators specified in the given
language. This is a non-trivial task, in general. Moreover,
in XACML it may be impossible to write the desired policy
due to its functional incompleteness. Thus, a policy author
may be forced to write a policy that approximates the de-
sired policy, which may lead to unintended or undesirable
decisions for certain requests.
2A number of policy algebras have also been defined, which
have some similarities with tree-structured languages. The
semantics of a policy are defined in terms of sets of autho-
rized and denied requests [3, 19, 15, 16], and policy operators
are defined in terms of set operations such as intersection
and union.
3An XACML rule is equivalent to an atomic policy.
Language Decisions Unary Ops Binary Ops
XACML {0, 1,⊥} 0 12
PTaCL {0, 1,⊥} 2 1
PTaCL(E) {0, 1,⊥} 2 1
PBel {0, 1,⊥,>} 1 2
Language CS? FC? CC?
XACML No No No
PTaCL Yes Yes No
PTaCL(E) Yes Yes Yes
PBel ? Yes ?
Table 1: Properties of ABAC languages
An alternative approach, supported by XACML, is to de-
fine custom combining algorithms. However, there is no
guarantee that the addition of a new combining algorithm
will make XACML functionally complete. Thus, more and
more custom algorithms may be required over time. This,
in turn, will make the design decisions faced by policy au-
thors ever more complicated, thereby increasing the chances
of errors and misconfigurations.
In other words, we believe it is preferable to define a
small number of operators having unambiguous semantics
and providing functional completeness. A functionally com-
plete ABAC language, such as PTaCL, can be used to con-
struct any conceivable policy using the operators provided
by the language. However, policy authors still face the chal-
lenge of finding the correct way to combine sub-policies using
those operators to construct the desired policy.
For example, PTaCL defines three policy operators ∧p,¬
and ∼. To express XACML’s deny- and permit-overrides
in PTaCL requires significant effort. For convenience, we
introduce the operator ∨p:
d ∨p d′ def= ¬((¬d) ∧p (¬d′)).
It is then possible to show that
d po d′ ≡ (d ∨p (∼d′)) ∧p ((∼d) ∨p d′), and
d do d′ ≡ ¬((¬d) po (¬d′)).
The operators po and do are equivalent to the permit- and
allow-overrides policy-combining algorithms in XACML. As
can be seen, the definitions of these operators in terms of
the PTaCL operators are complex, and, more generally, it is
a non-trivial task to derive such formulae.
Disjunctive normal form in propositional logic makes it
trivial to write down a logical formula, using only conjunc-
tion, disjunction and negation, that is equivalent to an ar-
bitrary Boolean function expressed in the form of a truth
table. Similarly, a canonically complete ABAC language,
such as PTaCL(E) [7], makes it possible to write down a
policy in normal form from its decision table. In this pa-
per, we show that there exist 4-valued canonically complete
logics in which the set of truth values forms a lattice. We
discuss why and how this can simplify policy generation in
Section 5.2.
In addition, policies in normal form may be more efficient
to evaluate. Given a formula in a 3-valued logic expressed
in normal form, any literal that evaluates to 0 causes the
entire clause to evaluate to 0, while any clause evaluating
to 1 means the entire formula evaluates to 1. In short, the
time required for policy evaluation may be reduced in many
cases. (This is similar to the way in which algorithms such
as first-applicable in XACML work: once an applicable pol-
icy is found policy evaluation terminates, even if there are
additional policies that could be evaluated.)
2.4 The Value of a Fourth Decision
The XACML 2.0 standard includes a fourth authoriza-
tion decision “indeterminate” [14]. This is used to indicate
errors have occurred during policy evaluation, meaning that
a decision could not be reached. The XACML 3.0 standard
extends the definition of the indeterminate decision to indi-
cate decisions that might have been reached, had evaluation
been possible [17]. However, the indeterminate decision is
used in XACML 3.0 for more than reporting errors. It is
also used as a decision in the “only-one-applicable” combin-
ing algorithm, which returns indeterminate if two or more
sub-policies are applicable.
More generally, a conflict decision is used in PBel (and
languages such as Rumpole and BelLog) to indicate that
two sub-policies return different conclusive decisions. PBel
is functionally complete. In the remainder of this paper, we
show that PBel is not canonically complete and then develop
a canonically complete 4-valued ABAC language.
3. LATTICE-BASED MULTI-VALUED
LOGICS
We first recall the definition of a lattice. Suppose (X,6)
is a partially ordered set. Then for a subset Y of X, we say
u is an upper bound of Y if y 6 u for all y ∈ Y . We say u′ is
a least upper bound or supremum of Y if u′ 6 u for all upper
bounds u of Y . Note that a least upper bound of Y (if it
exists) is unique. We define greatest lower bound or infimum
in an analogous way. A lattice (X,6) is a partially ordered
set such that for all x, y ∈ X there exists a least upper
bound of x and y, denoted sup {x, y}, and a greatest lower
bound of x and y, denoted by inf {x, y}. The least upper
bound of x and y is written as x ∨ y (the “join” of x and y)
and the greatest lower bound is written as x∧ y (the “meet”
of x and y). If (X,6) is a finite lattice, as we will assume
henceforth, then (X,6) has a maximum element (that is, a
unique maximal element) and a minimum element.
In the remainder of this section we (i) describe Belnap
logic [2], a well-known 4-valued lattice-based logic; (ii) ex-
tend the definitions of canonical suitability, selection oper-
ators and canonical completeness to lattices; and (iii) show
that Belnap logic and PBel are not canonically complete.
3.1 Belnap Logic
Belnap logic was developed with the intention of defining
ways to handle inconsistent and incomplete information in
a formal manner. It uses the truth values 0, 1, ⊥, and >,
representing “false”, “true”, “lack of information” and “too
much information”, respectively. In the remainder of this
paper, we will denote the four valued decision set {⊥, 0, 1,>}
by 4.
The truth values 0, 1, ⊥ and > have an intuitive inter-
pretation in the context of access control: 0 and 1 are in-
terpreted as the standard “deny” and “allow” decisions, ⊥
is interpreted as “not-applicable” and > represents a con-
flict of decisions. PBel is a 4-valued tree-structured ABAC
language [4] based on Belnap logic.
The set of truth values in Belnap logic admits two order-
ings: a truth ordering 6t and a knowledge ordering 6k. In
the truth ordering, 0 is the minimum element and 1 is the
maximum element, while ⊥ and > are incomparable indeter-
minate values. In the knowledge ordering, ⊥ is the minimum
element, > is the maximum element while 0 and 1 are in-
comparable. Both (4,6t) and (4,6k) are lattices, forming
the interlaced bilattice illustrated in Figure 3.
t
k
⊥
0 1
>
Figure 3: The 4 truth values in Belnap logic
We write the meet and join in (4,6t) as ∧b and ∨b, re-
spectively; and the meet and join in (4,6k) as ⊗b and ⊕b,
respectively. (We use the subscript b to differentiate the
Belnap operators from the PTaCL operators ∧p and ∨p.)
We may interpret values in V as operators of ar-
ity 0 (that is, constants). Then it is known that
L(4, {¬,∧b,∨b,⊗b,⊕b,⊃b,⊥, 0, 1,>}) is functionally com-
plete [1, Theorem 12] and that {¬,⊕b,⊃b,⊥} is a minimal
functionally complete set of operators [1, Proposition 17].
The truth tables for the binary operators ∧b, ∨b, ⊗b, ⊕b
and ⊃b are shown in Figure 11 (in Appendix B). The unary
operator ¬ has the effect of switching the values 0 and 1,
leaving ⊥ and > fixed; in other words, it acts like “classical”
negation.
3.2 Canonical Completeness
Jobe’s definition of canonical suitability for multi-valued
logics assumes a total ordering on the set of truth values.
Given that Belnap logic [1], on which PBel is based, is a 4-
valued logic in which the set of truth values forms a lattice,
we seek to extend the definition of canonical suitability to
lattice-based logics.
Let L be a logic associated with a lattice (V,6) of truth
values. Then L is canonically suitable if and only if there
exist in L two formulas φmax and φmin of arity 2 such that
φmax(x, y) returns sup{x, y} and φmin(x, y) returns inf{x, y}.
If a logic is canonically suitable, we will write φmax(x, y) and
φmin(x, y) using infix binary operators as x g y and x uprise y,
respectively.
Remark 1. The existence of sup {x, y} and inf {x, y} is
guaranteed in a lattice; this is not true in general for par-
tially ordered sets. And for a totally ordered (finite) set,
sup {x, y} = max {x, y} and inf {x, y} = min {x, y}, so our
definitions are compatible with those of Jobe’s for totally or-
dered sets of truth values.
We now extend the definition of selection operators to a
lattice-based logic. Let L be a logic associated with a lattice
(V,6) of truth values, with minimum truth value v. Then,
for a ∈ V n, the n-ary selection operator Sja is defined as
follows:
Sja(x) =
{
j if x = a,
v otherwise.
Note S
v
a(x) = v for all a,x ∈ V n.
The definitions for normal form and canonically complete-
ness for lattice-based logics are identical to total-ordered log-
ics. Nevertheless, we reiterate the definitions here in the in-
terests of clarity. The normal form of formula φ in a canon-
ically suitable logic is a formula φ′ that has the same truth
table as φ and has the following properties:
• the only binary operators it contains are g and uprise;
• no binary operator is included in the scope of a unary
operator;
• no instance of g occurs in the scope of the uprise operator.
A canonically suitable logic is canonically complete if every
unary selection operator can be expressed in normal form.
3.3 Completeness of Belnap Logic and PBel
Having extended the definitions of canonical suitability,
selection operators and canonical completeness to lattices,
we now investigate how these concepts can be applied to
Belnap logic [2]. The meet and join operators of the two
lattices (4,6t) and (4,6k) defined in Belnap logic are dif-
ferent. Canonical suitability for a 4-valued logic, defined as
it is in terms of the ordering on the set of truth values, will
thus depend on the ordering we choose on 4. Consequently,
the uprise and g operators, along with the selection operators,
will differ depending on the lattice that we choose.
In Section 5, we will argue in more detail for the use of
a lattice-based ordering on 4 to support a tree-structured
ABAC language. For now, we state that we will use
knowledge-ordered lattice (4,6k).4 The intuition is that the
minimum value in this lattice is ⊥ (rather than 0 in (4,6t))
and that this value should be the default value for a policy
(being returned when the policy is not applicable to a re-
quest). In the interests of brevity, we will henceforth write
4k, rather than (4,6k).
It follows from the functional completeness of
{¬,⊕b,⊃b,⊥} that L(4k, {¬,⊕b,⊃b,⊥}) is canonically
suitable. A similar argument applies to {¬,∧b,⊃b,⊥,>},
the set of operators used in PBel.
As ⊥ is the minimum truth value in the lattice 4k, the
n-ary selection operator Sja for 4k is defined by the following
function:
Sja(x) =
{
j if x = a,
⊥ otherwise.
Examples of selection operators are shown in Figure 4.
Functional completeness also implies all unary selec-
tion operators can be expressed as formulas in the logics
L(4k, {¬,⊕b,⊃b,⊥}) and L(4k, {¬,∧b,⊃b,⊥,>}). How-
ever, we have the following result, from which it follows that
neither of these logics is canonically complete.
Proposition 1. L(4k, {¬,∧b,∨b,⊗b,⊕b,⊃b,⊥, 0, 1,>})
is not canonically complete.
4It is worth noting that results analogous to those presented
in this paper can be obtained for the truth ordering. Results
for a total ordering on 4 can be derived using existing meth-
ods [7, 9].
x S00 S
>
1
⊥ ⊥ ⊥
0 0 ⊥
1 ⊥ >
> ⊥ ⊥
S0(1,>) ⊥ 0 1 >
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
0 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
1 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 0
> ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
Figure 4: Examples of selection operators in a logic based
on 4k
Proof. It is impossible to represent all unary selection
operators in normal form. The statement follows from the
following observations: (i) Belnap logic defines one unary
operator ¬; (ii) the only binary operators that may be used
in normal form are ⊕b (uprise) and ⊗b (g); and (iii) for any
operator ⊕ ∈ {¬,⊗b,⊕b} we have ⊥ ⊕ ⊥ = ⊥. Thus it is
impossible to construct a unary operator of the form Sd⊥ for
any d 6= ⊥.
Corollary 1. PBel is not a canonically complete autho-
rization language.
Proof. PBel uses the set of operators {¬,∧b,⊃b,⊥,>},
which is a subset of {¬,∧b,∨b,⊗b,⊕b,⊃b,⊥, 0, 1,>}. Thus,
by Proposition 1, this is not a canonically complete set of op-
erators, so L(4k, {¬,∧b,⊃b,⊥,>}) is not canonically com-
plete either. Hence, we may conclude that PBel is not a
canonically complete authorization language.
4. A CANONICALLY COMPLETE
4-VALUED LOGIC
In the proof of Proposition 1, we were unable to con-
struct all unary selection operators using operators from
the set {¬,⊗b,⊕b}, because there is no operator in which
⊥ ⊕ ⊥ 6= ⊥. This suggests that we will require at least
one additional unary operator −, say, such that −⊥ 6= ⊥.
Accordingly, we start with the unary operator, sometimes
called “conflation” [8], such that
−⊥ = >, −> = ⊥, −0 = 0, and −1 = 1.
Conflation is analogous to negation ¬, but inverts knowledge
values rather than truth values. In addition to −, we include
the operator ⊗b in our set of operators, since this is the join
operator for 4k.
Proposition 2. L(4k, {−,⊗b}) is canonically suitable.
Informally, the proof follows from the fact that − and ⊗b
have exactly the same effect on 4k as ¬ and ∧b have on
(4,6t). More formally, the following equivalence holds [1]:
d⊕b d′ ≡ −(− d⊗b − d′).
The decision table establishing this equivalence is given in
Figure 12 (in Appendix C). Hence, we conclude that the set
of operators {−,⊗b} is canonically suitable, since uprise corre-
sponds to ⊗b and g corresponds to ⊕b.
Proposition 3. L(4k, {−,⊗b}) is not functionally com-
plete.
Proof. The proof follows from the following observa-
tions: (i) for the operators − and ⊗b, −(0) = 0 and
0 ⊗b 0 = 0; and (ii) any operator ◦ which is a combina-
tion of − and ⊗b, we have 0 ◦ 0 = 0. Thus it is impossible
to construct an operator in which 0 ◦ 0 6= 0.
To summarize: L(4k, {¬,∧b,∨b,⊗b,⊕b,⊃b,⊥, 0, 1,>}) is
not canonically complete and L(4k, {−,⊗b}) is not function-
ally complete. We now investigate what additional opera-
tors should be defined to construct a set of operators which
is canonically complete (and hence functionally complete).
Given that we cannot use any operators besides g and
uprise in normal form, we focus on defining additional unary
operators on 4k. An important observation at this point is
that any permutation (that is, a bijection) pi : 4→ 4 defines
a unary operator on 4. Accordingly, we now explore the
connections between the group of permutations on 4 and
unary operators on 4.
4.1 The Symmetric Group and Unary
Operators
The symmetric group (SX , ◦) on a finite set of |X| sym-
bols is the group whose elements are all permutations of the
elements in X, and whose group operation ◦ is function com-
position. In other words, given two permutations pi1 and pi2,
pi1 ◦ pi2 is a permutation such that
(pi1 ◦ pi2)(x) def= pi1(pi2(x)).
We write pik to denote the permutation obtained by com-
posing pi with itself k times.
A transposition is a permutation which exchanges two el-
ements and keeps all others fixed. Given two elements a and
b in X, the permutation
pi(x) =

b if x = a,
a if x = b,
x otherwise,
is a transposition, which we denote by (a b). A cycle of
length k > 2 is a permutation pi for which there exists an
element x in X such that x, pi(x), pi2(x), . . . , pik(x) = x are
the only elements changed by pi. Given a, b and c in X, for
example, the permutation
pi(x) =

b if x = a,
c if x = b,
a if x = c,
x otherwise,
is a cycle of length 3, which we denote by (a b c). (Cycles
of length two are transpositions.) The symmetric group SX
is generated by its cycles. That is, every permutation may
be represented as the composition of some combination of
cycles.
In fact, stronger results are known. We first introduce
some notation. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} and let Sn denote the
symmetric group on the set of elements {1, . . . , n}. Then
(SX , ◦) is trivially isomorphic to (Sn, ◦) (via the mapping
xi 7→ i).
Theorem 2. For n > 2, Sn is generated by the transpo-
sitions (1 2), (1 3), . . . , (1n).
Theorem 3. For 1 6 a < b 6 n, the transposition (a b)
and the cycle (1 2 . . . n) generate Sn if and only if the great-
est common divisor of b− a and n equals 1.
In other words, it is possible to find a generating set com-
prising only transpositions, and it is possible to find a gen-
erating set containing only two elements.
4.2 New Unary Operators
We now define three unary operators ∼0,∼1 and ∼>,
which swap the value of ⊥ and the truth value in the op-
erator’s subscript. The truth tables for these operators are
shown in Figure 5. Note that ∼> is identical to the confla-
tion operator −. However, in the interests of continuity and
consistency we will use the ∼> notation in the remainder of
this section.
d ∼0 d ∼1 d ∼> d
⊥ 0 1 >
0 ⊥ 0 0
1 1 ⊥ 1
> > > ⊥
Figure 5: ∼0,∼1 and ∼>
Notice that ∼0, ∼1 and ∼> permute the elements of 4
and correspond to the transpositions (⊥ 0), (⊥ 1) and (⊥>),
respectively. Thus we have the following elementary result.
Proposition 4. Any permutation on 4 can be expressed
using only operators from the set {∼0,∼1,∼>}.
Proof. The operators ∼0,∼1 and ∼> are the transpo-
sitions (⊥ 0), (⊥ 1) and (⊥>) respectively. By Theorem 2,
these operators generate all the permutations in S4.
Lemma 1. It is possible to express any function φ : 4→ 4
as a formula in L(4k, {∼0,∼1,∼>,⊗b,⊕b}).
Proof. For convenience, we represent the function φ :
4→ 4 as the tuple
(φ(⊥), φ(0), φ(1), φ(>)) = (a, b, c, d).
Then, given x, y, z ∈ 4, we define the function
φyx(z) =
{
x if z = y,
⊥ otherwise.
Thus, for example, φ⊥a = (a,⊥,⊥,⊥). Then it is easy to see
that for all x ∈ 4
φ(x) = φ⊥a (x)⊕b φ0b(x)⊕b φ1c(x)⊕b φ>d (x).
That is φ = φ⊥a ⊕b φ0b ⊕b φ1c ⊕b φ>d .
Thus, it remains to show that we can represent φ⊥a ,
φ0b , φ
1
c and φ
>
d as formulas using the operators in
{∼0,∼1,∼>,⊗b,⊕b}. First consider the permutations φa,0,
φa,1 and φa,>, represented by the tuples (a,⊥, b1, c1),
(a, b2,⊥, c2) and (a, b3, c3,⊥), respectively.5 Since φa,0, φa,1
and φa,> are permutations, we know they can be written as
some combination of the unary operators. Moreover,
φ⊥a ≡ φa,0 ⊗b φa,1 ⊗b φa,>
Clearly, we can construct φ0b , φ
1
c and φ
>
d in a similar fashion.
The result now follows.
The decision tables showing the construction of φ⊥a (col-
umn 5) and φ (column 10) are shown in Figure 6.
5Note that the specific values of bi and ci are not important:
it suffices that each of φa,0, φa,1 and φa,> are permutations;
once bi is chosen such that bi 6∈ {a,⊥}, then ci is fixed.
Theorem 4. L(4k, {∼0,∼1,∼>,⊗b,⊕b}) is functionally
and canonically complete.
Proof. By Lemma 1, it is possible to express any func-
tion φ : 4 → 4 as a formula using operators from the
set {∼0,∼1,∼>,⊗b,⊕b}. In particular, all unary selection
operators can be expressed in this way. Hence by Theo-
rem 1, the set of operators {∼0,∼1,∼>,⊗b,⊕b} is func-
tionally complete.
Moreover, all formulae constructed in the proof of
Lemma 1 contain only the binary operators ⊕b(g) and
⊗b(uprise), and unary operators defined as compositions of
∼0,∼1 and ∼>. Thus, by definition, the unary selection
operators are in normal form.
Corollary 2. L(4k, {∼0,∼1,∼>,⊗b}) is functionally
and canonically complete.
Proof. The conflation operator − and ∼> are identical.
Hence
d⊕b d′ ≡ −(− d⊗b − d′) ≡ ∼>(∼> d⊗b ∼> d′).
Therefore, the set of operators is canonically suitable, and,
by Theorem 4, it is functionally and canonically complete
(since we can construct ⊕b).
Corollary 3. Let  be the unary operator correspond-
ing to the permutation given by the cycle (⊥ 0 1>). Then
L(4k, {∼>, ,⊗b}) is functionally and canonically complete.
Proof. By Theorem 3, ∼> and  generate all permuta-
tions in S4. The remainder of the proof follows immediately
from Lemma 1 and Theorem 4.
It is important to note that we could choose any trans-
position (a b), such that gcd(b − a, n) = 1. We specifically
selected the transposition (⊥>), as this has the effect of re-
versing the minimum and maximum knowledge values. An-
other choice for this transposition is one which swaps 0 and
1, specifically the transposition (0 1). This transposition is
the truth negation operator ¬, which in the context of access
control is a useful operator, since it swaps allow and deny
decisions.
4.3 Unary Operators for Totally Ordered
Logics
Having shown the construction for a canonically complete
4-valued logic, in which the set of logical values forms a lat-
tice, we briefly return to totally ordered logics. We construct
a totally ordered, canonically complete m-valued logic (thus
extending the work of Jobe, who only showed how to con-
struct a canonically complete 3-valued logic).
Let V be a totally ordered set of m truth values,
{1, . . . ,m}, with 1 < · · · < m. We define two unary op-
erators † and , which are the transposition (1m) and the
cycle (1 2 . . . m), respectively. In addition, we define one
binary operator ∧t, where x ∧t y = max {x, y}.
Proposition 5. Any permutation on V can be expressed
using only operators from the set {†, }.
Proof. The operator † is the transposition (1m) and
the operator  is the cycle (1 2 . . . m). By Theorem 3, these
operators generate all the permutations in SV .
Proposition 6. L(V, {†, ,∧t}) is canonically suitable.
x φa,0 φa,1 φa,> φa,0 ⊗b φa,1 ⊗b φa,> φ⊥a φ0b φ1c φ>d φ⊥a ⊕b φ0b ⊕b φ1c ⊕b φ⊥d
⊥ a a a a a ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ a
0 ⊥ b2 b3 ⊥ ⊥ b ⊥ ⊥ b
1 b1 ⊥ c3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ c ⊥ c
> c1 c2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ d d
Figure 6: Expressing φ : 4→ 4 using operators in {∼0,∼1,∼>,⊗b,⊕b}
Proof. Clearly x uprise y ≡ x ∧t y, it remains to show the
operator g can be expressed in L. By Proposition 5 we
can express any permutation of V in terms of † and . In
particular, we can express the permutation f , where f(i) =
m − i + 1, which swaps the values 1 and m, 2 and m − 1,
and so on. We denote the unary operator which realizes this
permutation by l. Then x g y ≡ x ∨t y ≡ l(lx ∧t l y).
Theorem 5. L(V, {†, ,∧t} is functionally and canoni-
cally complete.
We omit the proof, as it proceeds in an analogous manner
to those for Lemma 1 and Theorem 4. It is interesting to
note that we have constructed a canonically complete m-
valued logic which uses only two unary operators. This is
somewhat unexpected; intuition would suggest that m − 1
unary operators are required for a canonically complete m-
valued logic.
5. A CANONICALLY COMPLETE
4-VALUED ABAC LANGUAGE
Having identified a canonically complete set of operators
for Belnap logic, we now investigate how this set of operators
can be used in an ABAC language, and consider the advan-
tages in doing so. Crampton and Williams [7] showed the
operators in PTaCL can be replaced with an alternative set
of operators, taken from Jobe’s logic E, to obtain a canon-
ically complete 3-valued ABAC language. In the remainder
of this section, we describe a 4-valued lattice-ordered ver-
sion of PTaCL, based on the lattice 4k, which we denote by
PTaCL64 .
5.1 The Decision Set
We first reiterate there is value in having an ABAC lan-
guage for which policy evaluation can return a fourth value
>. Such a value is used in both XACML and PBel, although
its use in XACML is somewhat ad hoc and confusing since
it can be used to indicate (a) an error in policy evaluation,
or (b) a decision that arises for a particular operator during
normal policy evaluation.
We will use this fourth value to denote that (normal) pol-
icy evaluation has led to conflicting decisions (and we do not
wish to use deny-overrides or similar operators to resolve
the conflict at this point in the evaluation). (We explain
how we handle indeterminacy arising from errors in policy
evaluation in Section 5.3.) Two specific operators, “only-
one-applicable” (ooa) and “unanimity” (un) could make use
of >: the ooa operator returns the value of the applicable
sub-policy if there is only one such policy, and > otherwise;
whereas the un operator returns > if the sub-policies return
different decisions, and the common decision otherwise. The
decision tables for these operators are shown in Figure 7.
ooa ⊥ 0 1 >
⊥ ⊥ 0 1 >
0 0 > > >
1 1 > > >
> > > > >
un ⊥ 0 1 >
⊥ ⊥ > > >
0 > 0 > >
1 > > 1 >
> > > > >
Figure 7: Operators using >
In establishing canonical completeness for PTaCL(E),
Crampton and Williams assumed a total order on the set
of decisions (0 < ⊥ < 1). This ordering does not really re-
flect the intuition behind the use of 0, 1 and ⊥ in ABAC
languages. In the context of access control, 0 and 1 are
incomparable conclusive decisions, and ⊥ and > are deci-
sions that reflect the inability to reach a conclusive decision
either because a policy or its sub-policies are inapplicable
(⊥) or because a policy’s sub-policies return conclusive de-
cisions that are incompatible in some sense (>). Moreover,
we can subsequently resolve ⊥ and > into one of two (incom-
parable) conclusive decisions using unary operators such as
“deny-by-default” and “allow-by-default”. (The truth-based
ordering on 4 does not correspond nearly so well to the above
intuitions.)
5.2 Operators and Policies
We define the set of operators for PTaCL64 to be
{∼>, ,⊗b}, which we established is canonically complete
in Corollary 3. Recall that ∼> is equivalent to conflation
−; we will use the simpler notation − in the remainder of
this section. An atomic policy has the form (t, d), where t
is a target and d ∈ {0, 1}. (There is no reason for an atomic
policy to return > – which signifies a conflict has taken place
– in an atomic policy.) Then we have the following policy
semantics.
δq(t, p) =
{
δq(p) if νq(t) = 1,
⊥ otherwise;
δq(d) = d;
δq(−p) = −δq(p); δq( p) =  δq(p);
δq(p⊗b p′) = δq(p)⊗b δq(p′).
We now show how to represent the operator only-one-
applicable (ooa) in normal form. (Recall that it is possible
to represent this operator as a formula in PBel; however,
it is non-trivial to derive such a formula.) Using the truth
table in Figure 7 and by definition of the selection operators
and g, we have x ooa y is equivalent to
S⊥(⊥,⊥)(x, y) g S0(⊥,0)(x, y) g S1(⊥,1)(x, y) g S>(⊥,>)(x, y)g
S0(0,⊥)(x, y) g S>(0,0)(x, y) g S>(0,1)(x, y) g S>(0,>)(x, y)g
S1(1,⊥)(x, y) g S>(1,0)(x, y) g S>(1,1)(x, y) g S>(1,>)(x, y)g
S>(>,⊥)(x, y) g S>(>,0)(x, y) g S>(>,1)(x, y) g S>(>,>)(x, y).
Moreover, Sz(x,y) = S
z
x uprise Szy and Syx is a function φ : 4 → 4,
which can be represented as a composition of unary oper-
ators. Hence, we can derive a formula in normal form for
ooa.
Functional completeness implies we can write any bi-
nary operator (such as XACML’s deny-overrides policy-
combining algorithm) as a formula in L(4k, {−, ,⊗b}, and
hence we can use any operator we wish in PTaCL64 poli-
cies. However, canonical completeness and the decision set
(4,6k) allows for a completely different approach to con-
structing ABAC policies. Suppose a policy administrator
has identified three sub-policies p1, p2 and p3 and wishes to
define an overall policy p in terms of the decisions obtained
by evaluating these sub-policies. Then the policy adminis-
trator can tabulate the desired decision for all relevant com-
binations of decisions for the sub-policies, as shown in the
table below. The default decision is to return ⊥, indicating
that p is “silent” for other combinations.
p1 p2 p3 p
⊥ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 >
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
Then, treating p as a function of its sub-policies, we have
p ≡ S0(⊥,0,0) g S0(0,0,0) g S>(1,0,0) g S1(1,1,0) g S1(1,1,1).
The construction of p as a “disjunction” (g) of selection op-
erators ensures that the correct value is returned for each
combination of values (in much the same as disjunctive nor-
mal form may be used to represent the rows in a truth ta-
ble). Note that if p1, p2 and p3 evaluate to a tuple of values
other than one of the rows in the table, each of the selec-
tion operators will return ⊥ and thus p will evaluate to ⊥.
Each operator of the form Sd(a,b,c) can be represented as the
“conjunction” (uprise) of unary selection operators (specifically
Sda uprise Sdb uprise Sdc ).
Of course, one would not usually construct the normal
form by hand, as we have done above. Indeed, we have devel-
oped an algorithm which takes an arbitrary policy expressed
as a decision table as input, and outputs the equivalent nor-
mal form expressed in terms of the operators {−, ,⊗b}. In
order to develop this algorithm, we also derived expressions
for the unary selection operators in terms of the operators
{−, ,⊗b}. (In Lemma 1 we only showed that such expres-
sions exist.) Our implementation of the algorithm, compris-
ing just less than 150 lines of Python code, shows the ease
with which construction of policies can be both automated
and simplified, utilizing the numerous advantages that have
been discussed throughout this paper.6
5.3 Indeterminacy
6Code and test results available at goo.gl/0TM0RD.
XACML uses the indeterminate value in two distinct
ways:
1. as a decision returned (during normal evaluation) by
the “only-one-applicable” policy-combining algorithm;
and
2. as a decision returned when some (unexpected) error
has occurred in policy evaluation has occurred.
In the second case, the indeterminate value is used to rep-
resent alternative outcomes of policy evaluation (had the
error not occurred). We believe that the two situations de-
scribed are quite distinct and require different policy seman-
tics. However, the semantics of indeterminacy in XACML
are confused because (i) the indeterminate value is used in
two different ways, as described above, and (ii) there is no
clear and uniform way of establishing the values returned
by the combining algorithms when an indeterminate value
is encountered.
We have seen how > may be used to represent decisions
for operators such as ooa and un. We handle errors in target
evaluation (and thus indeterminacy) using sets of possible
decisions [5, 6, 10]. (This approach was adopted in a rather
ad hoc fashion in XACML 3.0, using an extended version of
the indeterminate decision.) Informally, when target evalua-
tion fails, denoted by νq(t) = ?, PTaCL assumes that either
νq(t) = 1 or νq(t) = 0 could have been returned, and re-
turns the union of the (sets of) decisions that would have
been returned in both cases. The formal semantics for pol-
icy evaluation in PTaCL64 in the presence of indeterminacy
are defined in Figure 8.
δq(t, p) =

δq(p) if νq(t) = 1,
{⊥} if νq(t) = 0,
{⊥} ∪ δq(p) if νq(t) = ?,
δq(d) = {d} ;
δq(−p) = {−d : d ∈ δq(p)} ;
δq( p) = { d : d ∈ δq(p)} ;
δq(p1 ⊗b p2) = {d1 ⊗b d2 : di ∈ δq(pi)} .
Figure 8: Semantics for PTaCL64 with indeterminacy
The semantics for the operators {−, ,⊗b} operate on
sets, rather than single decisions, in the natural way. A
straightforward induction on the number of operators in a
policy establishes that the decision set returned by these ex-
tended semantics will be a singleton if no target evaluation
errors occur; moreover, that decision will be the same as
that returned by the standard semantics.
5.4 Leveraging the XACML Architecture
XACML is a well-known, standardized language, and
many of the components and features of XACML are well-
defined. However, it has been shown that the rule- and
policy-combining algorithms defined in the XACML stan-
dard suffer from some shortcomings [10], notably inconsis-
tencies between the rule- and policy-combining algorithms.
PTaCL, on which PTaCL64 is based, is a tree-structured
ABAC language that is explicitly designed to use the same
general policy structure and evaluation methods as XACML.
However, PTaCL differs substantially from XACML in
terms of policy combination operators and semantics.
Thus, we suggest that PTaCL64 operators could replace
the rule- and policy-combining algorithms of XACML, while
those parts of the language and architecture that seem to
function well may be retained. Specifically, we use the
XACML architecture to: (i) specify requests; (ii) specify
targets; (iii) decide whether a policy target is applicable to
a given request; and (iv) use the policy decision point to eval-
uate policies. In addition, we would retain the enforcement
architecture of XACML, in terms of the policy decision, pol-
icy enforcement and policy administration points, and the
relationships between them.
We believe it would be relatively easy to modify the
XACML PDP to
• handle four decisions, extending the current set of val-
ues (“allow”, “deny” and “not-applicable”) to include
“conflict”;
• implement the policy operators {−, ,⊗b} as custom
combining algorithms; and
• work with decision sets, in order to handle indetermi-
nacy in a uniform manner.
For illustrative purposes, Appendix D specifies the modi-
fied decision set and pseudocode for the operator ⊗b in the
format used by the XACML standard.
The main difference to end-users would be in the sim-
plicity of policy authoring. Using standard XACML, policy
authors must decide which rule- and policy-combining algo-
rithms should be used to develop a policy or policy set that
is equivalent to the desired policy. This is error-prone and
it may not even be possible to express the desired policy us-
ing only the XACML combining algorithms. Using XACML
with the policy-combining mechanisms of PTaCL64 , we can
present an entirely different interface for policy authoring
to the end-user. The policy author would first specify the
atomic policies (XACML rules), then combine atomic poli-
cies using decision tables to obtain more complex policies
(as illustrated in Section 5.2). Those policies can be fur-
ther combined by specifying additional decision tables. At
each stage a back-end policy compiler can be used to con-
vert those policies into policy sets (using PTaCL64 operators)
that can be evaluated by the XACML engine.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Attribute-based access control is of increasing importance,
due to the increasing use of open, distributed, intercon-
nected and dynamic systems. The introduction of canon-
ically complete ABAC languages [7] provides the ability to
express any desired policy in a normal form, which allows
for the possibility of specifying policies in the form of a de-
cision table and then automatically compiling them into the
language.
In this paper, we make important contributions to the un-
derstanding of canonical completeness in multi-valued log-
ics and thus in ABAC languages. First, we extend Jobe’s
work on canonical completeness to multi-valued logics to the
case where the set of truth values forms a lattice. We show
that the Belnap set of operators [2] (and thus any subset
thereof) is not canonically complete, hence any ABAC lan-
guage based on these operators cannot be canonically com-
plete. In particular, PBel [4], probably the most well known
4-valued ABAC language, is not canonically complete. We
introduce a new four-valued logic L(4k, {−, ,⊗b}) which is
canonically complete, without having to explicitly construct
the unary selection operators in normal form (unlike Jobe [9]
and Crampton and Williams [7]). By identifying the connec-
tion between the generators of the symmetric group and the
unary operators of logics, we have developed a simple and
generic method for identifying a set of unary operators that
will guarantee the functional and canonical completeness of
an m-valued lattice-based logic. We also showed that there
is a set of operators containing only three connectives which
is functionally complete for Belnap logic, in contrast to the
set of size four identified by Arieli and Avron [1].
Second, we show in PTaCL64 how the canonically com-
plete set of operators {−, ,⊗b} can be used in an ABAC
language, and present the advantages of doing so. In partic-
ular, we are no longer forced to use a totally ordered set of
three decisions to obtain canonical completeness (as in the
case in PTaCL(E)). Moreover, the overall design of PTaCL
and hence PTaCL64 is compatible with the overall struc-
ture of XACML policies. We discuss how the XACML de-
cision set and rule-combining algorithms can be modified to
support PTaCL64 . Doing so enables us to retain the rich
framework provided by XACML for ABAC (in terms of its
languages for representing targets and requests) and its en-
forcement architecture (in terms of the policy enforcement,
policy decision and policy administration points). Thus, we
are able to propose an enhanced XACML framework within
which any desired policy may be expressed. Moreover, the
canonical completeness of PTaCL64 , means that the desired
policy may be represented in simple terms by a policy author
(in the form of a decision table) and automatically compiled
into a PDP-readable equivalent policy.
Our work paves the way for a considerable amount of fu-
ture work. In particular, we intend to develop a modified
XACML PDP that implements the PTaCL64 operators. We
also hope to develop a policy authoring interface in which
users can simply state what decision a policy should return
for particular combinations of decisions from sub-policies.
This would enable us to evaluate the usability of such an
interface and compare the accuracy with which policy au-
thors can generate policies using standard XACML combin-
ing algorithms compared with the methods that PTaCL64
can support.
On the more technical side, we would like to revisit the
notion of monotonicity [6] in targets and how this affects pol-
icy evaluation in ABAC languages. The definition of mono-
tonicity is dependent on the ordering chosen for the decision
set and existing work on monotonicity assumes the use of
a totally ordered 3-valued set (comprising 0, ⊥ and 1). So
it will be interesting to consider how the use of a 4-valued
lattice-ordered decision set affects monotonicity. We also
intend to investigate methods of policy compression, analo-
gous to the minimization of Boolean functions [13], where
we take the canonical form of a policy (generated from a
decision table) and rewrite it in such a way as to minimize
the number of terms in the policy.
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APPENDIX
A. JOBE’S CANONICALLY COMPLETE
3-VALUED LOGIC
Consider the 3-valued logic J [9], whose operators ∧e,∼1
and ∼2 are defined in Figure 9.
x ∼1 x ∼2 x
0 1 2
1 0 1
2 2 0
∧e 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
Figure 9: The operators in Jobe’s logic
It is easy to establish that
x uprise y ≡ x ∧e y and x g y ≡ ∼2(∼2(x) ∧e ∼2(y)).
Thus J is canonically suitable [9, Theorem 6]. The normal-
form formulas for the unary selection operators are shown
in Figure 10. (Note that S0i is the same for all i.) Thus
J is functionally and canonically complete [9, Theorem 7].
Hence, it is possible to construct a canonically complete 3-
valued logic using the operators {∧e,∼0,∼1}.
S0i (x) x ∧e ∼1(x) ∧e ∼2(x)
S10(x) ∼1(x) ∧e ∼2∼1(x)
S11(x) x ∧e ∼2(x)
S12(x) ∼1∼2(x) ∧e ∼2∼1∼2(x)
S20(x) ∼2(x) ∧e ∼1∼2(x)
S21(x) ∼2∼1(x) ∧e ∼2∼1∼2(x)
S22(x) x ∧e ∼1(x)
Figure 10: Normal forms for the unary selection operators
B. OPERATORS IN BELNAP LOGIC
∧b 0 ⊥ > 1
0 0 0 0 0
⊥ 0 ⊥ 0 ⊥
> 0 0 > >
1 0 ⊥ > 1
(a) ∧b
∨b 0 ⊥ > 1
0 0 ⊥ > 1
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 1 1
> > 1 > 1
1 1 1 1 1
(b) ∨b
⊗b ⊥ 0 1 >
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
0 ⊥ 0 ⊥ 0
1 ⊥ ⊥ 1 1
> ⊥ 0 1 >
(c) ⊗b
⊕b ⊥ 0 1 >
⊥ ⊥ 0 1 >
0 0 0 > >
1 1 > 1 >
> > > > >
(d) ⊕b
⊃b 0 ⊥ > 1
0 1 1 1 1
⊥ 1 1 1 1
> 0 ⊥ > 1
1 0 ⊥ > 1
(e) ⊃b
d ¬ d
0 1
⊥ ⊥
> >
1 0
(f) ¬
Figure 11: Operators in Belnap logic
C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The decision table in Figure 12 establishes the equiv-
alence of x ⊕b y and −(x ⊗b −y), which proves that
L((4,6k), {−,⊗b}) is a canonically suitable logic (Propo-
sition 2).
d d′ − d − d′ − d⊗b − d′ −(− d⊗b − d′) d⊕b d′
⊥ ⊥ > > > ⊥ ⊥
⊥ 0 > 0 0 0 0
⊥ 1 > 1 1 1 1
⊥ > > ⊥ ⊥ > >
0 ⊥ 0 > 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 ⊥ > >
0 > 0 ⊥ ⊥ > >
1 ⊥ 1 > 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 ⊥ > >
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 > 1 ⊥ ⊥ > >
> ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ > >
> 0 ⊥ 0 ⊥ > >
> 1 ⊥ 1 ⊥ > >
> > ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ > >
Figure 12: Encoding ⊕b using − and ⊗b
D. ENCODING PTACL DECISIONS AND
OPERATORS
In Figures 13 and 14 we illustrate how PTaCL64 extensions
could be incorporated in XACML by encoding the PTaCL64
decisions and ⊗b operator using the syntax of the XACML
standard.
<xs : element name= ‘ ‘ Decis ion ’ ’
type= ‘ ‘ xacml : DecisionType ’ ’/>
<xs : simpleType name= ‘ ‘DecisionType ’ ’>
<xs : r e s t r i c t i o n base= ‘ ‘ xs : s t r i ng ’ ’>
<xs : enumeration value = ‘ ‘Permit ’ ’/>
<xs : enumeration value = ‘ ‘Deny’ ’/>
<xs : enumeration value = ‘ ‘ Con f l i c t ’ ’/>
<xs : enumeration value = ‘ ‘ NotApplicable ’ ’/>
</xs : r e s t r i c t i o n>
</xs : simpleType>
Figure 13: The PTaCL64 decision set in XACML syntax
Dec i s ion ptaclCombiningAlgorithm (Node [ ] c h i l d r en )
{
Boolean atLeastOneDeny = f a l s e ;
Boolean atLeastOnePermit = f a l s e ;
f o r ( i=0 ; i < l engthOf ( ch i l d r en ) ; i++ )
{
Dec i s ion d e c i s i o n = ch i l d r en [ i ] . eva luate ( ) ;
i f ( d e c i s i o n = = NotAppl icable )
{ re turn NotAppl icable ; }
i f ( d e c i s i o n = = Permit )
{
atLeastOnePermit = true ;
cont inue ;
}
i f ( d e c i s i o n = = Deny)
{
atLeastOneDeny = true ;
cont inue ;
}
i f ( d e c i s i o n = = Con f l i c t )
{ cont inue ; }
}
i f ( atLeastOneDeny & & atLeastOnePermit )
{ re turn NotAppl icable ; }
i f ( atLeastOneDeny )
{ re turn Deny ; }
i f ( atLeastOnePermit )
{ re turn Permit ; }
re turn Con f l i c t ;
}
Figure 14: The PTaCL64 operator⊗b encoded as an XACML
combining algorithm
